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Abstract
In this paper we devise quantitative techniques to analyze the man-
agement of foreign capital 
ows in India over the past three decades.
The paper argues that India0s overall approach towards liberalization
of the capital account can be characterized as gradualist and calibrated,
whereby certain agents and 
ows have been accorded priority in the
liberalization process, from the viewpoint of ensuring nancial stabil-
ity. A cross country analysis indicates that the calibrated approach has
resulted in India being ranked towards the lower end of the spectrum
in terms of capital account openness. We analyze the extant regula-
tions governing dierent types of foreign capital 
ow, and highlight
the evolution of various types of capital 
ows over the recent period.
To evaluate Indian macroeconomic management in the face of capital

ows, we quantify the various policy options under the classic prob-
lem of \impossible trinity". We nd that India, like other emerging
markets, has also been confronted with the various alternatives under
\impossible trinity" and has chosen to adopt an intermediate regime,
juggling the objectives of monetary independence, exchange rate sta-
bility, and an open capital account as per the needs of the economy.
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11 Introduction
During the past few years, emerging market countries have witnessed a sharp
upheaval in capital 
ows with net private capital 
ows to these countries
dropping from a high of $1.3 trillion in 2007 to $530 billion in 2009, and
are estimated to rise to $746 billion in 2011. Such sharp swings in capital

ows create several problems for a country0s macroeconomic management,
and have once again ignited the debate on the extent to which emerging
markets should be subject themselves to the vagaries of capital 
ows. It is
widely agreed that the sharp volatility in capital 
ows in recent years had
very little to do with developments in developing markets. The initial `
ight
to safety' of international capital from emerging markets in 2008 was due
to sharp decline in the risk appetite of the global investors in the aftermath
of the collapse of nancial institutions in the United States. Ironically, this
decline in risk appetite pushed the investors to park their money in United
States treasury bonds, which witnessed an absolute decline in yields.
In contrast, the recent in
ow of capital into developing countries is driven
by a widening interest rate dierential due to extremely low interest rates
prevailing in the industrialized countries. Some of these 
ows are likely
to see a partial reversal once monetary easing in industrialized countries is
reversed.
Emerging market economies desire eective management of the capital 
ows
for primarily two main reasons. Unbridled capital 
ows can exacerbate some
existing nancial fragility and thereby lead to a crisis. Prasad and Rajan
(2008) contend that in an underdeveloped nancial system, foreign capital
is likely to be channeled to easily collateralized non-tradeable investments
like real estate, leading to asset price booms, with subsequent busts severely
disrupting the economy. Foreign portfolio investment into shallow equity
markets can also cause sharp valuation swings. Moreover, a number of
studies including Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Johnson et al. (2007) and
Prasad et al. (2007) show that massive unintended capital in
ows could
result in rapid real exchange rate appreciation, which can hurt exports of
emerging markets. In some cases even a short-term appreciation can have
lingering implications in the form of permanent loss of export market share
and reductions in manufacturing capacity. Alternatively, if the central bank
intervenes to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating, it is likely to lead
to an increase in money supply, fueling in
ationary pressures.
In response to these concerns and learning from some of the crisis episodes
in Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, India adopted
a calibrated approach towards capital account liberalization. While the
capital account has been progressively liberalized, the liberalization has not
been undertaken in an uniform manner. Certain types of 
ows and certain
2economic agents have been accorded priority in the liberalization process.
In this paper we undertake a review India0s approach towards liberalization
focusing on the policy regime aecting the dierent types of capital 
ows.
We also compare India0s extent of capital account openness with some of the
other emerging markets. We are primarily interested in the kind of monetary
policy and exchange rate response the calibrated approach towards capital
account liberalization has entailed. In other words, we intend to analyze
how has India managed the conundrum of the Impossible Trinity? In doing
so, we depart from the existing literature by quantifying the various policy
objectives under the impossible trinity. In doing so, we primarily follow the
methodology outlined in Aizenman et al. (2010). We use scal years and
cover a 30 year period from 1980-81 to 2009-10.
2 India0s Approach towards Capital Account Lib-
eralization
India0s overall management of capital 
ows can be characterized by its cali-
brated and gradualist approach towards capital account liberalization. With
the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s fresh in mind, India pri-
oritized certain kinds of 
ows and agents in the liberalization process. In
particular, right from the onset of the liberalization process, the need to
shift away from debt to non-debt creating 
ows, enforce strict regulation of
ECBs, especially the ones with short-term maturity, dissuade volatile 
ows
from NRIs and a gradual liberalization of out
ows, was recognized.
The primary form of non-debt creating 
ows include equity 
ows under FDI
and portfolio investment. The policy for foreign direct investment (FDI) and
portfolio in
ows has been signicantly liberalized over the past two decades.
Currently, barring a few sectors including some sensitive sectors and sectors
that require an industrial license, FDI is universally allowed. While certain
sectors are subject to sectoral caps, these caps have also been progressively
liberalized. As a result, FDI in
ows to India have steadily increased from
$2.1 billion in 1995-96 to $37.2 billion in 2009-10. Globally, India0s share in
inward FDI among developing countries has gone up from 1.3 percent during
1990 to 2000 to 7.2 percent in 2009. India has been more cautious in terms
of liberalizing portfolio investment. Only registered foreign institutional
investors (FIIs) regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) and non-resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs)
can undertake portfolio investments. There are separate investment caps
on sub accounts of FIIs, individual FII and aggregate FII investment in a
company. Even NRIs and PIOs are subject to caps at an aggregate and an
individual level. Despite these restrictions, portfolio investment in
ows have
3gone up from $2.7 billion in 1995-96 to $32.4 billion to 2009-10, although
they have experienced higher volatility during this period compared to direct
investment.
India has been much more conservative in terms of liberalizing debt 
ows.
External commercial borrowings (ECBs) are highly regulated with both bor-
rowers and lenders having to satisfy several eligibility criteria. Moreover, all
ECBs need to have a maturity of 3 years and in some cases 5 years. There
is also a cap on the all-in-cost payments that a corporate can make. Finally,
funds raised through these ECBs can be used to nance only certain activi-
ties like import of capital goods, new projects, modernization/expansion of
existing production units etc. ECB in
ows registered a sizeable jump during
the past few years, primarily due to the attractive global interest rates, and
have gone up from $5 billion in 2003 to over $30 billion in 2007.












































































































































































































































































































Source: Chinn and Ito (2008)
The sharp increase in capital in
ows in the years prior to the global -
nancial turmoil also provided the policymakers the condence to liberalize
out
ows. However, Indian again adopted a gradualist approach and liber-
alized in an incremental manner. The extent of outward direct investment
were constrained by an upper limit for automatic approval and the share
of net worth of rm that could be invested abroad. Similarly, there also
4exists a cap in terms of a percentage of the net worth of a rm that can be
invested abroad in the form of portfolio investment. These caps along with
some others that regulate outward foreign investment by mutual funds and
registered venture capital funds have been progressively liberalized over the
last two decades.
As a consequence of this cautious and gradualist approach towards capital
account liberalization, India0s extent of liberalization has been relatively
low compared to other emerging markets according to some of the standard
measures. The extent of capital account liberalization can be based on the
laws governing the movement of capital in or out of the country (de jure
measure) or by the quantum of these 
ows (de facto measure). Figure 1
indicates the decadal average de jure openness, developed in Chinn and Ito
(2008), of some key emerging market economies. It is evident that over
the last four decades there has been a signicant increase in the extent of
capital account openness indicated by the upward shift of the median line.
However, India has failed to keep pace with the liberalization process and
consequently has shifted from middle of the distribution of countries, ranked
according to their openness, during the 1970s and 1980s towards the more
restrictive end of spectrum in the last two decades.




































































































































































































































































































































Source: Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2007)
India has also been on the lower end of the spectrum when capital account
5openness is measured according to the extent of capital 
ows. Figure 2
shows that most of the Latin American as well as East Asian countries have
experienced far greater degree of integration on the basis of the Lane and
Milessi-Ferreti measure. Even China, which was lagging behind India in the
1980s, has overtaken India during the last two decades.
3 India0s Tryst with the Impossible Trinity
3.1 Quantifying the Impossible Trinity
While India0s extent of capital account openness has lagged that of other
emerging markets it has increased considerably since early 1980s. The ratio
of gross capital 
ows to GDP has increased from 4.5 percent in 1980-81 to a
peak of 62.4 percent in 2007-08 before declining to 46.2 percent in 2009-10.
The increased integration with global nancial markets has created several
policy challenges. In particular, India had to grapple with the concept of
\impossible trinity", which points out that it is not simultaneously possi-
ble to have an completely open capital account, an independent monetary
policy and a managed exchange rate. Only two of the three objectives can
be obtained at a particular point in time. A country can obtain a stable
exchange rate regime with an open capital account by giving up monetary
independence. The monetary authority can no longer independently vary
the domestic interest rate, which will have to follow the foreign interest rate.
Alternatively, a country can retain monetary independence and an open
capital account but will have to forgo exchange rate stability. Exchange rate
movement will be dictated by the interest rate dierential and quantum of
international capital 
ows. Finally, the imposition of capital controls breaks
the link between the interest rate and the exchange rate and allows a country
to retain exchange rate stability with monetary independence.
India, like other emerging markets, would like to achieve each of three above
objectives with varying degrees. While capital 
ows aid growth by providing
external capital to sustain an excess of investment over domestic savings,
a competitive exchange rate helps maintain a sustainable current account
balance and an independent monetary policy stabilizes the economy in the
face of domestic and exogenous shocks.
India did not face the various tradeos under impossible trinity prior to the
1990s as India0s extent of capital account openness was extremely low till
then and hence there was no dichotomy between stabilizing the exchange
rate and retaining monetary independence. It is mainly in recent years when
with a rise in capital account integration, India has been forced to juggle
the various con
icting objectives. To analyze the extent pursuit of one of
6the objectives has entailed giving up of the other two objectives we need to
quantify the various objectives of the impossible trinity. We do this, largely,
following the methodology outlined in Aizenman et al. (2010). We cover a
30 year span from 1980-81 to 2009-10.
Monetary Independence
We measure the extent of monetary independence as the inverse of the an-
nual correlation of the monthly interest rates between India and the United
States. The United States is taken as the base country following Aizenman
et al. (2010) and Shambaugh (2004) who argue that Indian monetary policy
through this period was most closely linked to the United States. We use
the money market rates for the interest rates. In India, the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) uses a number of monetary policy tools like the repo rate,
reverse repo rate, reserve ratio etc. Changes in any of these are going to
have an impact on the money market rate. Following Aizenman et al. (2010)
the index for extent of monetary independence is given by




where i refers to the Indian money market rate and i indicates the US
money market rate. This index can take a maximum value of 1 and a
minimum value of 0. By construction a higher value of the index implies
greater monetary independence. While data on Indian money market rates
are taken from the Reserve Bank of India, data on United States' rates are
obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Exchange Rate Rigidity
The index for Exchange Rate Rigidity is calculated using the annual stan-






where  indicates the standard deviation and  is the rst dierence oper-
ator and  is log of the bilateral exchange rate between the Indian Rupee
and the US Dollar. Again, the way the index is created it will lie between 0
and 1 with a higher number indicating a more rigid exchange rate regime.
Aizenman et al. (2010) point out that a mechanical application of this in-
dex can exaggerate the degree of 
exibility in cases where the exchange rate
moves within a narrow band but gets devalued or revalued infrequently. In
such instances, the average value of the monthly change in the exchange rate
would be so small that even small changes would lead to a large standard
deviation resulting in a small value of the ERS. To prevent these downward
7biases, we apply a threshold to the exchange rate movement. If the rate of
monthly change in the exchange rate is within  0.33 percent bands, the
exchange rate is assumed to be xed and the ERS index takes a value of 1.
Capital Account Openness
While constructing an index of capital account openness we deviate from
Aizenman et al. (2010) who use the de jure measure developed in Chinn
and Ito (2008). For India, this might not be the most appropriate measure
as according to it India0s extent of openness remained virtually unchanged
since the 1970s due to India0s retention of some minimal controls even in case
of 
ows, which have been signicantly liberalized. Moreover, it is the actual
quantum of 
ows that creates a con
ict between monetary independence
and exchange rate stability. A country with high de jure openness can have
low capital 
ows and hence be able to simultaneously stabilize exchange
rate and retain monetary autonomy. Alternatively, a country with low de
jure openness can experience large 
ows due to low enforcement of capital
controls, and face a trade-o between ensuring monetary independence and
exchange rate stability. Thus a de facto measure seems conceptually more
appropriate.
We construct an index of capital account openness, Cap Open, based on
net capital 
ows. The index is constructed as the ratio of absolute value
of net capital 
ows to GDP. The focus on net capital 
ows is based on the
fact that it is the capital account balance that is crucial for the impossible
trinity. If capital in
ows in a country were to be matched by an equal
quantum of capital out
ows, the central bank can still have the option of
retaining monetary independence with a stable exchange rate. To make this
index comparable with ERS and MI indices, we normalize this index to lie





Table 1 provides the main summary statistics for the three con
icting policy
objectives. As can be seen there has been a wide range of variation on all
the three indices during the 30 year period under study.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Trilemma Policy Objectives
Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Monetary Independence 30 0.448 0.168 0.132 0.716
Exchange Rate Stability 30 0.515 0.203 0.154 1
Capital Account Openness 30 0.243 0.188 0 1
1The index based on net in
ows is highly correlated with an index based on gross 
ows.
In fact the normalized indices have a correlation coecient in excess of 0.93
8Before going further, one needs to analyze whether major domestic and
international events have been associated with structural breaks in the index
series. Two key important events that might have in
uenced the policy
choices of the authorities are the economic reforms initiated after the 1991
crisis and the contagion from the East Asian crisis in 1997. To exclude the
impact of the crisis we leave out the crisis year and the subsequent year.
Table 2 shows that on average monetary independence declined signicantly
after India initiated its reform process in 1991. In contrast, capital account
openness index doubled in the post reform period compared to the pre-
reform period. We get similar results when we consider a break due to the
Asian crisis. In both cases there is a marginal change in the exchange rate
stability, but the dierence is not signicant. This implies that in recent
years the increase in capital 
ows have forced the authorities to relinquish
some degree of monetary independence. In contrast, there has not been a
signicant change in 
exibility of the Rupee against the US Dollar.
Table 2: Mean Equality Test
1980-81 1992-93 1980-81 1998-99
to to to to
1990-91 2009-10 1996-97 2009-10
Monetary Independence 0.599 0.376 0.524 0.324
Dierence 0.222 0.2
t-stat 4.208 3.873
Exchange Rate stability 0.514 0.539 0.516 0.528
Dierence -0.025 -0.012
t-stat -0.318 -0.158
Capital Account Openness 0.146 0.305 0.177 0.338
Dierence -0.159 -0.161
t-stat -2.231 -2.41
A comparison of the evolution of these indices over time indicates the devel-
opment of the payments regime in India. To do this, we resort to `diamond
charts' where we measure monetary independence, exchange rate stability
and capital account openness on the three vertices. A possible way for the
authorities to manage the dichotomy between monetary independence and
exchange rate stability, over the short-run, is by accumulating or decumu-
lating reserves. Consequently, following Aizenman et al. (2010) we focus on,
Res, the absolute change in reserves (as a share of GDP)2. To make it
comparable with the other measures we also normalize this measure to be
between 0 and 1. The origin in these diamond charts indicate completely

oating exchange rate, zero monetary independence, zero net 
ows and no
change in international reserves holding. Figure 3 highlights the evolution
of these policy objectives for India during 1980-81 to 2009-10.
2From 1997-98 onwards the measure is based on the actual intervention by the RBI
to exclude valuation changes. However, for the period before April 1997, due to data






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10Figure 3a and 3b, show that during the 1980s there was limited amount of
international capital movement with the Cap Open and Res index 
uc-
tuating between 0 and 0.24 and 0 and 0.1, respectively. This allowed the
policymakers to simultaneously retain monetary independence and main-
tain exchange rate stability. While the MI index varied between 0.51 and
0.71 the ERS index 
uctuated between 0.33 and 0.69. Towards the end of
the decade, India0s macroeconomic health began to deteriorate signicantly.
The current account decit increased to 0.9 percent of GDP in 1983-84 to
2.3 percent in 1989-90, due to liberalization of imports, a sharp spike in oil
prices due to the Gulf crisis and economic deterioration in India0s major
export markets such as the Middle East and erstwhile Soviet Union. To
nance the decit some of the capital controls were relaxed, and the cur-
rent account decit started being nanced by non-resident remittances and
borrowings at commercial terms.
India witnessed one of its rst confrontations with the impossible trinity
during 1993-94 and 1994-95. There was a surge of capital in
ow aided by
newer prot opportunities arising due to the economic reforms and lower
global interest rates. The Cap Open index increased to an average of 0.34
during these years, compared to an average of 0.14 during the 1980s. Con-
sequently, there was a choice between either allowing nominal exchange rate
to appreciate and giving up exchange rate stability or managing the ex-
change rate and allowing the money supply to change, thereby relinquishing
monetary independence.
Figure 4b shows that India opted for a stable exchange rate regime with
the Rupee-Dollar rate remaining steady at 31.4 from April 1993 to August
1995, resulting in an ERS index of 1 during 1993-94 to 1994-95. The as-
sociated intervention in the forex market caused RBIs net foreign assets to
increase from Rs.153 billion in February 1993 to over Rs.770 billion in 1996
causing the Res index to rise to 0.48 in 1993-94 and 0.32 in 1994-95. A
paucity of instruments and an illiquid bond market prevented an eective
sterilization of the foreign in
ows, re
ected in a marginal decline in net do-
mestic assets. Consequently, reserve money growth accelerated to over 20
percent, contributing to a rapid increase in in
ation. The loss of monetary
independence is re
ected in Figure 3c with a drop in the MI index to 0.32
in 1993-94 and 0.445 in 1994-95 from an average of 0.6 in the 1980s.
There was a sharp reversal of situation in the second half of the 1990s. Sev-
eral domestic and external factors contributed to a slowdown in capital 
ows.
In
ow of foreign capital to India was adversely aected following contagion
from countries in East Asia and Latin America, which were impacted by a
series of nancial crises. The situation was exacerbated with the imposition
of economic sanctions on India after it had conducted nuclear tests in May
1998. Furthermore, this was also a period of political instability as the coun-
11Figure 4: Reserve Accumulation, Sterilization & Exchange Rate: 1992-96
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Source: RBI Handbook of Statistics 2010
try faced three general elections and four prime ministers between 1996 and
1999. Finally, in the developed countries there was a decline in economic
activity due to the bursting of the dotcom bubble in the early 2000s. As
a result, in Figure 3d, the Cap Open index hovered between 0.11 and 0.25
during 1995-96 to 2001-02 (except for 1996-97 when it took a value of 0.31)
with an average value of 0.19. These events led to sporadic downward pres-
sure on the Indian Rupee during this period, in response to which the RBI
allowed the Rupee to depreciate moderately. The Rupee weakened against
the US Dollar by 12 percent between July 1995 and February 1996 (Mexi-
can crisis), another 11 percent between August 1997 and January 1998 (East
Asian crisis), and nally 7.5 percent between May 1998 and August 1998
(nuclear tests and the Russian crisis). Thus the ERS index indicates a rela-
tively low value during 1995-96 to 1998-99, ranging between 0.27 and 0.41.
During 1999-2000 and 2001-02, the volatility in the exchange rate declined
signicantly, although there was a general trend of depreciation to oset the
in
ation dierential and to maintain a stable real eective exchange rate.
This allowed the ERS index to 
uctuate between 0.57 and 0.75 during this
period.
Limited capital 
ow and a rise in exchange rate 
exibility allowed the RBI
assert greater degree of monetary independence. Most of the depreciation
episodes were associated with the RBI tightening monetary policy through
raising interest rates and the reserve ratio as well as reducing renance limits
to prevent built up of in
ationary pressure. As a result, the MI index ranged
between 0.5 and 0.64 during 1995-96 to 1998-99. However, RBIs attempt to
engineer a moderate depreciation in later years led to a drop in the index
and it ranged between 0.25 and 0.42 during 1999-00 to 2001-02.
The various policy trade-os under the impossible trinity got exacerbated
since 2002 due to a steady increase in capital in
ows, which was re
ected
in the Cap Open index rising from an average of 0.19 during 1999-00 to
12Figure 5: Reserve Accumulation, Sterilization & Exchange Rate: 2001-10
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Source: RBI Handbook of Statistics 2010
2001-02 to marginally higher 0.21 in 2002-03 and further to 0.31 in 2003-
04. Again, there was a dichotomy between preventing large scale volatility
in the exchange rate and retaining monetary independence. The RBI again
intervened in the foreign exchange market to prevent the Rupee form appre-
ciating rapidly, which resulted in the ERS index taking a value of 0.79 and
0.70 during 2002-03 and 2003-04 respectively. Between April 2001 and April
2004, the RBI purchased more than $61 billion (Rs.2.3 trillion) of dollars.
Despite the RBI trying to sterilize most of the intervention by depleting its
stock of net domestic assets from Rs.1.9 trillion in April 2001 to Rs.0.19
trillion in April 2004, growth rate of reserve money doubled from around 5
percent in early 2000 to over 10.3 percent in March 2002. Hence, as shown
in Figure 3e the MI index averaged around a low 0.2 between 2001-02 and
2003-04.
Towards late 2003, the RBI started to run out of government bonds for ster-
ilization, and in January 2004, a new instrument for sterilization - Market
Stabilization Scheme (MSS) bonds - was introduced. The RBI sold these
MSS bonds on the behalf of the government to sterilize the impact of capital
in
ows. By August 2005, the amount of outstanding MSS bonds increased to
Rs. 0.71 trillion. However, with a rising amount of outstanding MSS bonds,
the scal cost of sterilization became a worrisome issue. Consequently, the
RBI resorted to incomplete sterilization of the capital 
ows, which led to
an increase in the growth rate of reserve money. In addition, it reduced its
intervention in the foreign exchange market, which led to the Rupee appre-
ciating by 6.5 percent between August 2004 and July 2005. As a result, the
ERS index dropped to 0.39 and 0.44 in 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively.
In 2006-07 and 2007-08, the surge in capital 
ow accelerated and the capi-
tal account registered a surplus of $46 billion and $107 billion, respectively
resulting in the Cap Open index rising to 0.54 and 1.0. The RBI opted
for an intermediate regime to manage the impossible trinity. It introduced
13several measures to limit capital 
ows. These included imposing restric-
tions on ECBs curbing the use of Participatory Notes (PNs) and introduc-
ing measures to limit loans to both foreign and domestically held mutual
funds operating in India. The RBI again resorted to heavy intervention and
purchased over $95.4 billion (Rs.4.0 trillion) during this period resulting in
Res index rising to 0.43 and 1.0 in 2006-07 and 2007-08. While, despite
a growing scal cost, fresh MSS bonds worth Rs. 1.5 trillion were issued
between April 2006 and November 2007 to sterilize the purchases, it was
not enough to completely sterilize the foreign in
ows. The CRR was also
raised by 200 basis points to suck out some of the injected liquidity. Finally,
the Rupee was allowed to appreciate signicantly over this period. The
Rupee appreciated against the Dollar by 15 percent over this period, while
the trade weighted REER appreciated by 10 percent between May 2006 and
November 2007. As a result, in Figure 3f, the ERS index dropped to 0.44
and 0.36. These steps allowed the monetary authority additional degrees of
freedom and as a result the MI index rose marginally to 0.25 in 2006-07 and
0.38 in 2007-08 from an average of 0.18 between 2003-04 and 2005-07.
The outbreak of the sub-prime crisis in the United States in late 2007 led to
`
ight to safety' of foreign capital from emerging markets in. In India, while
portfolio 
ows in 2008-09 turned negative and there was a net out
ow of $14
billion, it was more than oset by net in
ows through FDI ($17.5 billion)
and loans ($8.7 billion) to register a net in
ow of $7.2 billion. The sharp
drop in net in
ows compared to previous led to Cap Open index declining to
0.05 in 2008. The RBI responded to the drop in capital 
ows and declining
exports by allowing the Rupee to depreciate sharply. During 2008-09, the
Rupee weakened by nearly 21.2 percent against the US Dollar resulting in
ERS index dropping to 0.27. Even the trade weighted REER depreciated
by 14 percent. The decline in capital in
ows and rise in 
exibility of the Ru-
pee allowed the authorities to pursue a more independent monetary policy,
re
ected by an MI index of 0.52, aimed at bolstering the Indian economy.3
Since April 2009, there has been a resumption of capital 
ow to emerging
markets with India receiving net capital in
ows of $53.6 billion during 2009-
10. This resurgence in capital 
ow has once again forced India to make
some tough policy choices. The RBI has tried to curb the in
ow of capital
by introducing certain restrictions. The all-in-cost ceilings, which were with-
drawn in January 2009, to encourage ECBs, were reimposed in December
2009 with the reimposed ceiling being higher by 100 to 150 basis points from
the pre-crisis levels. In addition, foreign currency convertible buybacks were
3The RBI took a series of measures to counter the drop in liquidity in the aftermath of
collapse of Lehman Bros. These included lowering of the key policy rates, Cash Reserve
Ratio (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), unwounding of MSS bonds, opening
of new renance windows, lowering of prudential norms in relating to provisioning and
risk weights. For details see Mohan (2009)
14discontinued. In this episode the RBI has refrained from intervening in the
foreign exchange market to mitigate the pressures of appreciation. Between
March 2009 and April 2010, the RBI actually sold around $2.6 billion of re-
serves. Such low levels of intervention caused the Res index to drop down
to 0. In contrast, the Rupee has been allowed to appreciate. It appreciated
by nearly 17 percent between March 2009 and April 2010. Even, the 36
currency NEER appreciated by more than 9.3 percent.
RBI0s reluctance to intervene and sterilize can be attributed to RBIs pre-
occupation to manage record borrowing requirements of the government in
2009-10 and 2010-11. Sterilization of in
ows can drive the interest rates
up, which will have negative consequences for government borrowing. Fur-
thermore, incomplete sterilization of the in
ows would increase the money
supply and exacerbate in
ationary pressure, which the RBI is keen to pre-
vent with in
ation crossing 10 percent in March 2010. Finally, a strong
currency is going to help moderate in
ation by reducing the cost of im-
portables. However, RBI has left the option of sterilization in the future
open by agreeing to replenish the MSS bonds to the tune of Rs. 500 billion.
A further increase in in
ows may be countered by the use of these bonds.
3.2 Relationship between the Policy Choices under Impos-
sible Trinity
In the above section we found that India has adopted an intermediate regime
to manage the impossible trinity, and has juggled the objectives of exchange
rate stability, monetary policy independence and opening up of the capital
account as per the demands of the macroeconomic situation. In this section,
we analyze whether the macroeconomic goals were binding on India i.e. if
India faced trade-os among the various policy choices. Aizenman et al.
(2010) point out that a key obstacle in measuring the trade-os under the
impossible trinity is that the framework does not impose any obvious func-
tional form on the nature of trade-os. It is implied that an increase in one
of the impossible trinity indices should induce a drop of the second or the
third index, or a combination of the two. Following Aizenman et al. (2010)
we test the validity of the linear framework i.e. whether the weighted sum
of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a constant. This is done
by focusing on the following equation
1 = MIt + ERSt + 
CapOpent (4)
We run the above regression for the full sample as well as sub-sample periods
identied earlier. A high goodness of t indicates that the linear specication
explains well the trade-os among the policy dimensions. Table 3 shows that
15the adjusted R-squares for the full sample as well as the sub-samples are in
excess of 95 percent. Thus in India the three policy goals are linearly related
to each other and there is a trade-o between the three policy options.
A division of the entire period on the basis of the 1991 balance of payments
crisis and the Asian crisis indicates signicant variation in coeecients across
dierent time periods implying that over time India has altered the weights
on these policy options.
Table 3: Testing the Validity of the Linear Framework
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1980-81 1980-81 1992-93 1980-81 1998-99
to to to to to
2009-10 1991-92 2009-10 1997-98 2009-10
Monetary Independence 1.010*** 1.160** 1.028*** 1.268*** 0.886**
[7.681] [2.582] [4.615] [11.40] [2.729]
Exchange Rate Stability 0.673*** 0.381* 0.685*** 0.386** 1.024***
[4.987] [1.616] [4.843] [2.398] [7.905]
Capital Account Openness 0.582*** 0.937* 0.546** 0.48* 0.418*
[3.033] [1.694] [2.400] [1.788] [1.928]
R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.955 0.973 0.969
To look at the extent of the policy choice actually implemented by the
policymakers we look at the predicted coecients and the actual value of
the variables i.e. ^ MI, ^ ERS and ^ 
Cap Open. In Figure 6 we look at the
contribution of each policy orientation over the last three decades. While
Figure 6a is based on Column (1) of Table 3, Figure 6b and Figure 6c are
drawn on Columns (2) to (5).
Despite being quantitatively dierent the above gures indicate a similar
story qualitatively. During the early 1980s monetary policy independence
was given the highest preference followed by exchange rate stability and
nancial openness. However towards the end of the 1980s there was a decline
in the extent of monetary independence, which bottomed out in 1993-94.
The decline in monetary independence was associated with an increase in
preference for exchange rate stability and a marginal increase in the extent
of the capital account openness during this period.
There was a reversal of trend in the mid 1990s with a resurgence of monetary
independence associated with a dip in exchange rate stability. The late 1990s
and the early 2000s witnessed a secular decline in monetary independence as
the RBI managed the exchange rate to maintain a constant REER. The rise
in net capital in
ows from 2003-04 was initially associated with a decline
in both monetary independence and exchange rate stability. However, from
2007 onwards several domestic and external events like overheating of the
economy, commodity price shocks and the global nancial crisis has resulted
in the RBI asserting greater monetary independence, while at the same time
allowing greater exchange rate 
exibility.














































17By comparing the predicted values based on the above regression i.e., ^ MI
+ ^ ERS + ^ 
Cap Open over a time horizon, one can obtain some inferences
about the extent to which the trilemma is \binding". A linear specication
implies that the predicted value should be closer to 1. In Figure 7 we see
that the predicted values hover around 1 for most of the period across the
three specications. During the early 1980s the prevalence of the policy
combination of independent monetary policy and exchange rate stability
pushed the predicted values close to unity. The balance of payments crisis
in 1991 resulted in a sharp drop in the predicted values in 1991-92 and 1992-
93 as there was a sharp drop in all the three indices. However, rising net
capital 
ows and a quest for a stable exchange rate regime meant that the
predicted values rapidly increased to close to 1 in the mid 1990s. Reduced
capital 
ows as well as lower level of monetary independence meant that
the impossible trinity was not binding for the Indian economy during the
late 1990s and early 2000s and the predicted values were well below 1. It
was only from 2003-04 onwards when rising capital account openness and a
resurgence in monetary policy independence pushed the predicted values to
be close to unity.














There is now an emerging consensus that countries need to actively manage
their capital account to avoid vulnerabilities associated with nancial crisis.
While it is widely agreed that capital 
ows aid growth by providing external
capital to sustain an excess of investment over domestic savings, in recent
years, many emerging markets, including India, have received capital 
ows
18that are far greater than their current account nancing requirements cre-
ating macroeconomic management challenges. In such cases, excess capital

ows tends to feed into real exchange rate misalignment, excesses in credit
market, asset price booms, building up of in
ationary pressure and overall -
nancial fragility. In particular, unbridled capital 
ows result in problems for
overall macroeconomic management by creating a dichotomy between pur-
suing an independent monetary policy and maintaining a stable exchange
rate.
This brings in the need to actively manage capital 
ows. While capital
controls can be eective they are generally not foolproof, and are vulnerable
to leakages through nancial engineering. In such circumstances, a gamut of
policy measures has to be used to ensure nancial stability of the economy.
These would include exchange rate 
exibility, holding of adequate reserves,
intervention in the foreign exchange market, and overall development of the
nancial sector.
India has also resorted to the multiple instrument approach while dealing
with capital 
ows. The overall policy architecture encompassed active man-
agement of capital 
ows, especially volatile and debt 
ows; a moderately

exible exchange rate regime with the RBI intervening at times to prevent
excessive volatility; sterilization of these interventions through multiple in-
struments like MSS bonds and CRR; and building up of a stockpile of re-
serves. This intermediate approach has suited India well as it has been able
to maintain a healthy growth rate, targeted monetary and credit growth
rates, moderate in
ation rate through most of the period and a sustainable
current account decit.
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